Correspondence Bias in Performance Evaluation: Why Grade Inflation Works

43 Pages Posted: 24 May 2005

See all articles by Francesca Gino

Francesca Gino

Harvard University - Business School (HBS)

Don A. Moore

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

Samuel A. Swift

Carnegie Mellon University

Zachariah S. Sharek

Carnegie Mellon University

Date Written: July 19, 2007

Abstract

When explaining others' behaviors, achievements, and failures, it is common for people to attribute too much influence to the individual's disposition and too little influence to the structural and situational influences impinging on the actor. Although performance is a joint function of ability and situational facilitation or impediments, dispositional inference ascribes too much to individual ability. We hypothesize that this tendency leads university admissions decisions to favor students coming from institutions with lenient grading because they will have their high performance mistaken for evidence of high ability. In four studies using both laboratory experiments and actual admissions decisions, we show that those who display high performance simply due to lenient grading or to an easy task are favored in selection. These results have implications for research on attribution, because they provide a more stringent test of the correspondence bias, and allow for a more precise measure of its size. Implications for admissions and personnel selection decisions are also discussed.

Keywords: correspondence bias, grade inflation, admissions decisions

Suggested Citation

Gino, Francesca and Moore, Don A. and Swift, Samuel A. and Sharek, Zachariah S., Correspondence Bias in Performance Evaluation: Why Grade Inflation Works (July 19, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=728627 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.728627

Francesca Gino

Harvard University - Business School (HBS) ( email )

Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States

Don A. Moore (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Samuel A. Swift

Carnegie Mellon University ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

Zachariah S. Sharek

Carnegie Mellon University ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States