Common Agency Games with Separable Preferences

24 Pages Posted: 31 May 2005

See all articles by Andrea Attar

Andrea Attar

Toulouse School of Economics; University of Roma Tor Vergata

Dipjyoti Majumdar

Concordia University, Quebec - Department of Economics

Gwenael Piaser

Universite du Luxembourg

Nicolas Porteiro

University Pablo de Olavide

Date Written: May 2006

Abstract

This paper examines the role of direct mechanisms in common agency games. We focus on pure strategies and deterministic contracts and show how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent is sufficient for the Revelation Principle to hold in in this setting, when finite generic games are considered. The result goes through without imposing any restriction on the principals' payoffs. Therefore, it is still possible to restrict attention to direct mechanisms without any loss of generality even when competition over contracts is considered.

Keywords: Revelation Principle, Common Agency, Separable Preferences

JEL Classification: D82

Suggested Citation

Attar, Andrea and Majumdar, Dipjyoti and Piaser, Gwenael and Porteiro, Nicolas, Common Agency Games with Separable Preferences (May 2006). University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 28/06. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=729933 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.729933

Andrea Attar

Toulouse School of Economics

21, allée de Brienne
Toulouse, F 31000
France
+33 5 61128578 (Phone)

University of Roma Tor Vergata ( email )

2 Via Columbia
00100 Rome
Italy

Dipjyoti Majumdar

Concordia University, Quebec - Department of Economics ( email )

1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd. W.
Montreal, Quebec H3G 1MB
Canada

Gwenael Piaser (Contact Author)

Universite du Luxembourg ( email )

148, avenue de la Faïencerie
Luxembourg, L-1511
Luxembourg
+ 352 46 66 44 6811 (Fax)

Nicolas Porteiro

University Pablo de Olavide ( email )

Ctra. Utrera, Km.1
Sevilla, Seville 41010
Spain

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