On the Cores of Cooperative Games and the Stability of the Weber Set
International Game Theory, Vol. 26, No. 4 (1997)
Posted: 2 Apr 1998
Abstract
In this paper conditions are given guaranteeing that the Core equals the D-core (the set of unDominated imputations). Under these conditions, we prove the non-emptiness of the intersection of the Weber set with the imputation set. This intersection has a special stability property: it is externally stable. As a consequence we can give a new characterization (th. 3.2) for the convexity of a cooperative game in terms of its stability (von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions) using the Weber set.
JEL Classification: C71
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Rafels Pallarola, Carles and Tijs, Stef H., On the Cores of Cooperative Games and the Stability of the Weber Set. International Game Theory, Vol. 26, No. 4 (1997), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=73068
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