Choice and Achievement at the Bargaining Table: The Distributive, Integrative, and Interpersonal Advantages of Making Multiple Equivalent Simultaneous Offers

30 Pages Posted: 1 Jun 2005

Date Written: June 1, 2005

Abstract

We propose that in dyadic negotiations simultaneously offering multiple package proposals that are of the same value to the proposer (what we refer to as multiple equivalent simultaneous offers, or MESOs), affords a distributive and integrative advantage to that negotiator. Making MESOs has a number of advantages over simply making a single package offer. MESOs are beneficial because they allow negotiators to collect information while being persistent and aggressive at the bargaining table, but also to be perceived as being flexible and accommodating. Four experiments demonstrate the distributive, integrative, and interpersonal benefits of making MESOs. In Experiment 1, respondents receiving multiple offers were likely to accept an offer and more satisfied with the offer than respondents receiving a single offer of the same value. In Experiment 2, negotiators who made MESOs achieved better distributive outcomes and were perceived as being more flexible. In Experiment 3, when both negotiators made MESOs, they achieved more efficient outcomes. In Experiment 4, when both negotiators made MESOs, they were more likely to reach an agreement in a dispute.

Keywords: Negotiations, choice, multiple equivalent simultaneous offers

Suggested Citation

Husted Medvec, Victoria and Leonardelli, Geoffrey J. and Galinsky, Adam D. and Claussen-Schulz, Aletha, Choice and Achievement at the Bargaining Table: The Distributive, Integrative, and Interpersonal Advantages of Making Multiple Equivalent Simultaneous Offers (June 1, 2005). IACM 18th Annual Conference. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=732665 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.732665

Victoria Husted Medvec (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-467-4028 (Phone)
847-491-8896 (Fax)

Geoffrey J. Leonardelli

University of Toronto ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada
1-416-946-0731 (Phone)
1-416-978-4629 (Fax)

Adam D. Galinsky

Columbia Business School - Management ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Aletha Claussen-Schulz

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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