Multiple Equivalent Simultaneous Offers (MESOs) Reduce the Negotiator Dilemma: How a Choice of First Offers Increases Economic and Relational Outcomes

20 Pages Posted: 1 Jun 2005 Last revised: 13 Jun 2019

See all articles by Geoffrey J. Leonardelli

Geoffrey J. Leonardelli

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management; University of Toronto - Department of Psychology

Jun Gu

Monash University - Department of Management

Geordie McRuer

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Victoria Husted Medvec

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Adam D. Galinsky

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Management

Date Written: January 2019

Abstract

The tension that negotiators face between claiming and creating value is particularly apparent when exchanging offers. We tested whether presenting a choice among first offers (Multiple Equivalent Simultaneous Offers; MESOs) reduces this negotiator dilemma and increases economic and relational outcomes. Six experiments comparing MESOs to a single package-offer revealed three effects. First, MESOs produced stronger anchors and better outcomes for the offerer because recipients perceived MESOs as a more sincere attempt at reaching an agreement (agreement sincerity). Second, MESOs yielded greater joint outcomes because they were probabilistically more likely to include an economically attractive starting point for recipients (initial recipient-value). Third, MESOs allowed the offerer to secure a cooperative reputation and created a more cooperative negotiation climate. Negotiators who offered MESOs were able to claim and create more economic and relational value. MESOs reduced the negotiator dilemma for offerers by also reducing it for recipients. Weblinks in the appendix give access to supplementary materials, analyses, and data.

Keywords: Negotiations, choice, multiple equivalent simultaneous offers

Suggested Citation

Leonardelli, Geoffrey J. and Gu, Jun and McRuer, Geordie and Husted Medvec, Victoria and Galinsky, Adam D., Multiple Equivalent Simultaneous Offers (MESOs) Reduce the Negotiator Dilemma: How a Choice of First Offers Increases Economic and Relational Outcomes (January 2019). 2. Leonardelli, G.J., Gu, J., McRuer, G., Medvec, V., & Galinsky, A.D. (2019). Multiple equivalent simultaneous offers (MESOs) reduce the negotiator dilemma: How a choice of first offers increases economic and relational outcomes. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 152, 64-82, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=732665 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.732665

Geoffrey J. Leonardelli (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada
1-416-946-0731 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/FacultyAndResearch/Faculty/FacultyBios/Leonardelli.aspx

University of Toronto - Department of Psychology ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada
1-416-946-0731 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/FacultyAndResearch/Faculty/FacultyBios/Leonardelli.aspx

Jun Gu

Monash University - Department of Management ( email )

Wellington Road
Clayton, Victoria 3168
Australia

Geordie McRuer

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Victoria Husted Medvec

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-467-4028 (Phone)
847-491-8896 (Fax)

Adam D. Galinsky

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Management ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

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