Beyond Reactive Devaluation: Implementation Concerns and Fixed-Pie Perceptions Involving the Geneva Accords

23 Pages Posted: 6 Jun 2005

See all articles by Jeremy Ginges

Jeremy Ginges

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Institute for Social Research (ISR)

Deepak K. Malhotra

Harvard Business School - Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit

Date Written: February 2005

Abstract

Prior research on reactive devaluation has consistently and convincingly shown that negotiators devalue objectively identical offers when they are made by the other party rather than by one's own party. However, in many or most real world negotiation contexts, authorship of specific offers and proposals cannot be attributed to one or the other of the conflicting parties. More typically, the offer or proposal under consideration is the outcome of a negotiation itself. This study identifies the possibility of reactive devaluation in such contexts, and then tests for its existence using data on Israeli support for the Geneva Accords. The results suggest that implementation concerns might mitigate reactive devaluation by creating a demand for a "match" in the degree to which each side supports (or opposes) the agreement. Strategic and theoretical implications are discussed.

Keywords: Reactive devaluation, fixed-pie perceptions, Geneva accords

Suggested Citation

Ginges, Jeremy and Malhotra, Deepak K., Beyond Reactive Devaluation: Implementation Concerns and Fixed-Pie Perceptions Involving the Geneva Accords (February 2005). ; IACM 18th Annual Conference. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=735065 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.735065

Jeremy Ginges

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Institute for Social Research (ISR) ( email )

Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1248
United States

Deepak K. Malhotra (Contact Author)

Harvard Business School - Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit ( email )

Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States

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