Loose with the Truth: Predicting Deception in Negotiation

31 Pages Posted: 7 Jun 2005

See all articles by Mara Olekalns

Mara Olekalns

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Business School

Philip Smith

University of Melbourne - Department of Psychology

Date Written: June 1, 2005

Abstract

Using a simulated, two-party negotiation, we examined how characteristics of the factor, target and situation affected deception. We focused on how negotiators talked about an indifference issue, that is, an issue that had no value for them. We found that negotiators misrepresented the value of this issue (sin of commission) when the other party was not benevolent and concealed information (sin of omission) when they reported a negative mood. Negotiators were less likely to leverage this issue when the other party was benevolent or reliable but more likely to leverage it when the other party had integrity. We also found that dyad composition - whether a dyad contained 0, 1 or 2 cooperatively-oriented negotiators - interacted with characteristics of the actor and target to predict both honesty and deception.

Keywords: Dyadic negotiation, deception, trust

Suggested Citation

Olekalns, Mara and Smith, Philip L., Loose with the Truth: Predicting Deception in Negotiation (June 1, 2005). IACM 18th Annual Conference. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=735163 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.735163

Mara Olekalns (Contact Author)

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Business School ( email )

200 Leicester Street
Carlton, Victoria 3053 3186
Australia
+61 3 9349 8146 (Phone)
+61 3 9349 8133 (Fax)

Philip L. Smith

University of Melbourne - Department of Psychology ( email )

School of Behavioural Science
Victoria 3010
Australia
+61 3 8344 6343 (Phone)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
311
Abstract Views
1,987
rank
96,925
PlumX Metrics