Subgroup and Superordinate Caucusing in Intergroup Negotiations

42 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2005

See all articles by Roderick I. Swaab

Roderick I. Swaab

INSEAD

Rachael Eggins

The Australian National University

Tom Postmes

University of Exeter; Universiteit van Amsterdam (UVA)

Date Written: June 1, 2005

Abstract

Two interactive studies on multiparty negotiations - with parties represented by several negotiators - show that different interaction structures (or caucusing structures) influence the formation of shared social identities, thereby influencing negotiation behavior and outcomes (Study 1, N = 108, Study 2, N = 238). Subgroup caucusing led to higher subgroup identification, the development of more shared cognition and better material outcomes. Superordinate group caucusing led to superordinate group identification, stimulating fair behavior, and promoting social outcomes that were equitable and satisfactory. A combination of both subgroup and superordinate communication led to a form of group solidarity that contained elements of subgroup differentiation within the superordinate commonality of a negotiating group. This type of caucusing structure was also most closely associated with interactions that were both procedurally and distributively fair.

Keywords: Shared Cognition, Fairness, Negotiation Outcomes

Suggested Citation

Swaab, Roderick I. and Eggins, Rachael and Postmes, Tom, Subgroup and Superordinate Caucusing in Intergroup Negotiations (June 1, 2005). IACM 18th Annual Conference. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=736227 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.736227

Roderick I. Swaab (Contact Author)

INSEAD ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

Rachael Eggins

The Australian National University ( email )

Canberra, Australian Capital Territory
Australia

Tom Postmes

University of Exeter ( email )

Exeter EX4 4QX, Devon
United Kingdom

Universiteit van Amsterdam (UVA)

Spui 21
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

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