Carbon Leakage Revisited: Unilateral Climate Policy with Directed Technical Change

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2005-68

FEEM Working Paper No. 94.06

23 Pages Posted: 9 Jun 2005

See all articles by Corrado Di Maria

Corrado Di Maria

University of East Anglia

Edwin van der Werf

PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency

Date Written: June 2006

Abstract

The increase in carbon dioxide emissions by some countries in reaction to an emission reduction by countries with climate policy (carbon leakage) is seen as a serious threat to unilateral climate policy. Using a two-country model where only one of the countries enforces an exogenous cap on emissions, this paper analyzes the effect of technical change that can be directed towards the clean or dirty input, on carbon leakage. We show that, as long as technical change cannot be directed, there will always be carbon leakage through the standard terms-of-trade effect. However, once we allow for directed technical change, a counterbalancing induced technology effect arises and carbon leakage will generally be lower. Moreover, we show that when the relative demand for energy is sufficiently elastic, carbon leakage may be negative: the technology effect induces the unconstrained region to voluntarily reduce its own emissions.

Keywords: Climate policy, carbon leakage, directed technical change, international trade

JEL Classification: F18, O33, Q54, Q55

Suggested Citation

Di Maria, Corrado and van der Werf, Edwin, Carbon Leakage Revisited: Unilateral Climate Policy with Directed Technical Change (June 2006). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2005-68, FEEM Working Paper No. 94.06, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=739126 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.739126

Corrado Di Maria

University of East Anglia ( email )

Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom
441603592866 (Phone)

Edwin Van der Werf (Contact Author)

PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency ( email )

PO box 303
The Hague, 3720
Netherlands

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