Local and Global Interactions in an Evolutionary Resource Game

32 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2005

See all articles by Joëlle Noailly

Joëlle Noailly

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis

Jeroen C. J. M. van den Bergh

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics

Cees Withagen

Free University of Amsterdam; Tilburg University

Date Written: May 2005

Abstract

Conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game are studied. This combines in a unique way local and global interactions. A fixed number of harvesters are located on a spatial grid. Harvesters choose among three strategies: defection, cooperation, and enforcement. Individual payoffs are affected by both global factors, namely, aggregate harvest and resource stock level, and local factors, such as the imposition of sanctions on neighbors by enforcers. The evolution of strategies in the population is driven by social learning through imitation. Numerous types of equilibria exist in these settings. An important new finding is that clusters of cooperators and enforcers can survive among large groups of defectors. We discuss how the results contrast with the non-spatial, but otherwise similar, game of Sethi and Somanathan (1996).

Keywords: Common property, Cooperation, Evolutionary game theory, Global interactions, Local interactions, Social norms

JEL Classification: C72, Q2

Suggested Citation

Noailly, Joëlle and van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M. and Withagen, Cees A. M., Local and Global Interactions in an Evolutionary Resource Game (May 2005). FEEM Working Paper No. 78.05. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=740164 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.740164

Joëlle Noailly (Contact Author)

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis ( email )

P.O. Box 80510
2508 GM The Hague, 2585 JR
Netherlands

Jeroen C.J.M. Van den Bergh

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Faculty of Economics and Econometrics
1081HV Amsterdam
Netherlands

Cees A. M. Withagen

Free University of Amsterdam ( email )

Tinbergen Institute De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands

Tilburg University ( email )

Postbus 90153
Tilburg, DC 5000 LE
Netherlands

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