Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game

43 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2005

See all articles by Joëlle Noailly

Joëlle Noailly

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis

Cees Withagen

Free University of Amsterdam; Tilburg University

Jeroen C. J. M. van den Bergh

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics

Date Written: May 2005

Abstract

We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game. We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located around a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest payoffs on average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find that a large diversity of equilibria exists in this game. In particular, we derive conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies coexist. We also discuss the stability of these equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria.

Keywords: Common property, Evolutionary game theory, Local interactions game, Self-organization, Cooperation

JEL Classification: C72, Q2

Suggested Citation

Noailly, Joëlle and Withagen, Cees A. M. and van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M., Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game (May 2005). FEEM Working Paper No. 79.05. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=740287 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.740287

Joëlle Noailly (Contact Author)

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis ( email )

P.O. Box 80510
2508 GM The Hague, 2585 JR
Netherlands

Cees A. M. Withagen

Free University of Amsterdam ( email )

Tinbergen Institute De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands

Tilburg University ( email )

Postbus 90153
Tilburg, DC 5000 LE
Netherlands

Jeroen C.J.M. Van den Bergh

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Faculty of Economics and Econometrics
1081HV Amsterdam
Netherlands

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