The Bundesbank's Communications Strategy and Policy Conflicts with the Federal Government
34 Pages Posted: 10 Jun 2005
Abstract
In this paper we provide an estimate of the likelihood of conflict between the federal government and the Bundesbank for the 1989 - 1998 period. We rely on a novel proxy for the impact of public communication by Bundesbank officials on the probability of conflict, in addition to interest rate, exchange rate, money supply behavior, as well as electoral influences. The empirical evidence is consistent with the view that speeches by the Bundesbank President dealing with inflation and economic policy are a positive source of conflict in a probabilistic sense. Conflict was not a constant but flared up at times of economic stress and could be exacerbated by the talking of Bundesbank officials.
Keywords: Deutsche Bundesbank, conflict, central bank communication, political factors
JEL Classification: E32, E58, E63
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy
By Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini
-
Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy
By Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini
-
Who is Afraid of Political Instability?
By Nauro F. Campos and Jeffrey B. Nugent
-
External Debt and Political Instability
By Sule Ozler and Guido Tabellini
-
By Nauro F. Campos and Jeffrey B. Nugent
-
Elections, Fiscal Policy and Growth: Revisiting the Mechanism
-
Political Uncertainity, Public Expenditure and Growth
By Anton Muscatelli, Julia Darby, ...