The Bundesbank's Communications Strategy and Policy Conflicts with the Federal Government

34 Pages Posted: 10 Jun 2005

See all articles by Martin T. Bohl

Martin T. Bohl

University of Muenster

Pierre L. Siklos

Wilfrid Laurier University - School of Business & Economics; Balsillie school of international affairs

Abstract

In this paper we provide an estimate of the likelihood of conflict between the federal government and the Bundesbank for the 1989 - 1998 period. We rely on a novel proxy for the impact of public communication by Bundesbank officials on the probability of conflict, in addition to interest rate, exchange rate, money supply behavior, as well as electoral influences. The empirical evidence is consistent with the view that speeches by the Bundesbank President dealing with inflation and economic policy are a positive source of conflict in a probabilistic sense. Conflict was not a constant but flared up at times of economic stress and could be exacerbated by the talking of Bundesbank officials.

Keywords: Deutsche Bundesbank, conflict, central bank communication, political factors

JEL Classification: E32, E58, E63

Suggested Citation

Bohl, Martin T. and Siklos, Pierre L., The Bundesbank's Communications Strategy and Policy Conflicts with the Federal Government. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=740299

Martin T. Bohl (Contact Author)

University of Muenster ( email )

Schlossplatz 2
D-48149 Muenster, D-48149
Germany

Pierre L. Siklos

Wilfrid Laurier University - School of Business & Economics ( email )

Department of Economics
75 University Avenue W.
Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3C5
Canada
519-884-0710 Ext.. 3491 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://pierrelsiklos.com

Balsillie school of international affairs ( email )

67 Erb Street West
Waterloo, ON N2L 6C2
Canada

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