Reputations in Markets with Asymmetric Information: A Classroom Game

20 Pages Posted: 10 Jun 2005

See all articles by James R. Wolf

James R. Wolf

Illinois State University

Mark A. Myerscough

Illinois State University

Date Written: November 30, 2005

Abstract

This paper describes a classroom game used to teach students about the impact of reputations in markets with asymmetric information. The game is an extension of Holt and Sherman's lemons market game and simulates a market under three information conditions. In the full information setting, all participants know both the quality and the price of the items for sale. In the second setting, sellers have better quality information than buyers. In the third setting, sellers maintain their information advantage, but buyers may post feedback on the sellers' performance. The posted feedback generally increases buyer trust and disciplines sellers resulting in higher levels of trade and higher average product quality. The game can be completed in one class period and includes a set of discussion questions.

Keywords: Classroom game, reputation, trust, asymmetric Information

JEL Classification: A22, A23, D82

Suggested Citation

Wolf, James R. and Myerscough, Mark A., Reputations in Markets with Asymmetric Information: A Classroom Game (November 30, 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=740565 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.740565

James R. Wolf (Contact Author)

Illinois State University ( email )

Campus Box 5150
Normal, IL 61761
United States

Mark A. Myerscough

Illinois State University ( email )

Normal, IL 61790
United States

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