Intermediation and Vertical Integration

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 30, No. 3, Part 2 (August 1998)

Posted: 6 Apr 1998

See all articles by Mitchell Berlin

Mitchell Berlin

Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia - Research Department

Loretta J. Mester

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Abstract

Competition in retail and wholesale funding markets affect the incentive for originators (like investment bankers) and fund managers (like mutual funds) to form integrated intermediaries (banks). Independent firms integrate both to produce higher yielding, illiquid assets and to suppress competition in retail markets. In addition to the higher return on illiquid assets, three factors increase the incentive to integrate. First, homogeneous savers lower the costs of producing illiquid assets and increase competition in retail markets. Second, fund managers' market power in wholesale markets increases competition in retail markets. Finally, more certain aggregate savings reduces the costs of producing illiquid assets.

JEL Classification: G21

Suggested Citation

Berlin, Mitchell and Mester, Loretta J., Intermediation and Vertical Integration. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 30, No. 3, Part 2 (August 1998). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=74148

Mitchell Berlin (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia - Research Department ( email )

Ten Independence Mall
Philadelphia, PA 19106-1574
215-574-3822 (Phone)
215-574-4364 (Fax)

Loretta J. Mester

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland ( email )

East 6th & Superior
Cleveland, OH 44101-1387
United States

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

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