Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market

28 Pages Posted: 6 Jul 2005 Last revised: 29 Aug 2010

See all articles by Alvin E. Roth

Alvin E. Roth

HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Tayfun Sonmez

Boston College - Department of Economics

M. Utku Ünver

Boston College - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 2005

Abstract

Patients needing kidney transplants may have willing donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other such pairs. The situation facing such pairs resembles models of the "double coincidence of wants," and relatively few exchanges have been consummated by decentralized means. As the population of available patient-donor pairs grows, the frequency with which exchanges can be arranged will depend in part on how exchanges are organized. We study the potential frequency of exchanges as a function of the number of patient-donor pairs, and the size of the largest feasible exchange. Developing infrastructure to identify and perform 3-way as well as 2-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants, and will help the most vulnerable patients. Larger than 3-way exchanges have much smaller impact. Larger populations of patient-donor pairs increase the percentage of patients of all kinds who can find exchanges.

Suggested Citation

Roth, Alvin E. and Sonmez, Tayfun Oguz and Unver, Utku, Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market (June 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11402. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=741551

Alvin E. Roth (Contact Author)

HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit ( email )

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Boston, MA 02163
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Tayfun Oguz Sonmez

Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )

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Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

Utku Unver

Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )

140 Commonwealth Ave.
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
+1 (617) 552 2217 (Phone)
+1 (617) 552 2318 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www2.bc.edu/~unver

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