Political-Economy of Safeguards and Antidumping in Argentina

41 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2005

See all articles by Julio J. Nogues

Julio J. Nogues

Academia Nacional de Ciencias Economicas

Elias Baracat

Independent

Date Written: May 2005

Abstract

Starting in the late 80s, Argentina implemented a series of reforms that were revolutionary in speed and scope, including trade liberalization. After implementation of these policies, a record number of antidumping (AD) petitions came forward. Under a situation of high inflation, the government reinforced its fiscal and monetary policies by announcing that it would minimize the use of such measures. The flexible disciplines of the existing domestic AD regulations faciliated this objective.

Later, when the GATT/WTO-sanctioned trade remedies were implemented, the Government made a serious attempt to establish discipline by including liberal regulations, and creating special institutional arrangements. A presumption built into construction of the new mechanisms was that adhering to WTO requirements would strengthen the resistance against protection. This presumption turned out to be false. Changing circumstances including severe peso overvaluation, had significant impacts on the number and outcome of AD investigations.

Keywords: Antidumping, Safeguards, Argentina, WTO rules, Mercosur, Trade Liberalization

JEL Classification: F13, F14, F15

Suggested Citation

Nogues, Julio J. and Baracat, Elias, Political-Economy of Safeguards and Antidumping in Argentina (May 2005). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3587. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=743124 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.743124

Julio J. Nogues (Contact Author)

Academia Nacional de Ciencias Economicas ( email )

Avenida Alvear 1790
Capital Federal, 1021
Argentina

Elias Baracat

Independent ( email )

No Address Available

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
102
Abstract Views
1,329
rank
260,171
PlumX Metrics