Yoram Barzel and the New Institutional Economics

17 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2005

See all articles by Dean Lueck

Dean Lueck

Indiana University Bloomington - The Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory & Policy Analysis; Indiana University

Date Written: February 2005

Abstract

This article examines the relationship between the work of Yoram Barzel and the New Institutional Economics. Barzel has developed a property rights/transaction cost approach to economics and has written on topics ranging from car racing to slavery to Jewish lending to voting rules in condominium associations. Among his many ideas are those about racing to claim assets, multitasking, rationing by waiting, divided ownership of complex assets, measurement costs, and the economic origins of democracy. In the process Barzel's work unearthed the economic rationale for many institutions and offered a framework for analyzing them. Barzel holds an important place among all economists for expanding the scope of economic science in a way that focuses attention on the importance of institutions and the economic logic of their variety. In this way he has been a crucial part of the New Institutional Economics.

Keywords: Yoram Barzel, New Institutional Economics, Property Rights, Transaction costs

JEL Classification: D23, B41

Suggested Citation

Lueck, Dean, Yoram Barzel and the New Institutional Economics (February 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=744224 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.744224

Dean Lueck (Contact Author)

Indiana University Bloomington - The Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory & Policy Analysis ( email )

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Indiana University ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://https://economics.indiana.edu/home/people/lueck/

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