The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony
CIRPEE Working Paper No. 05-20; University of Bern Economics Discussion Paper No. 05-06
24 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2005
Date Written: June 2005
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of them distorts the evidence less than when they testify alone. When the fixed cost of testifying is low, the arbiter hears both, for intermediate values one, and for high values no party at all. The ability to commit to an adjudication scheme makes it more likely that the arbiter requires evidence.
Keywords: Evidence production, procedure, costly state falsification, adversarial, inquisitorial
JEL Classification: D82, K41, K42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation