Competition and Entry in Banking: Implications for Capital Regulation
49 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2006
Date Written: February 4, 2007
We assess how capital regulation interacts with the degree of competitiveness of the banking industry. We particularly ask two questions: i) how does capital regulation affect endogenous entry; and ii) how do changes in the competitive environment affect bank monitoring choices and the effectiveness of capital regulation? Our approach deviates from the extant literature in that it allows for heterogeneous bank quality and recognizes the fixed costs associated with the banks' monitoring technologies. Our most striking result is that increasing costly capital requirements can lead to more entry into banking, essentially by reducing the competitive strength of lower quality banks. We show that an implication of this is that banks may want the regulator to impose a higher capital requirement on the industry than is socially optimal. We also show that competition improves the monitoring incentives of better quality banks and deteriorates the incentives of lower quality banks; and that precisely for those lower quality banks competition typically compromises the effectiveness of capital requirements. We generalize the analysis along a few dimensions, including an analysis of the effects of asymmetric competition, e.g. one country that opens up its banking system for competitors but not vice versa.
Keywords: Competition, entry, capital regulation, banking
JEL Classification: G28, G21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation