Inter-Governmental Competition: Market Solutions to Political Problems

CORE Discussion Paper No. 2004/87

15 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2005

See all articles by Jean Hindriks

Jean Hindriks

University of London - School of Economics and Finance

Date Written: November 2004

Abstract

In normative public economics, inter-governmental competition is usually viewed as harmful. Although empirical support for this position does not abound, market integration has intensified competition among developed countries. In this paper we argue that when assessing welfare effects of inter-governmental competition for various forms of government imperfections (the public choice critique), the outcome is ambiguous and competition can be welfare improving.

Suggested Citation

Hindriks, Jean, Inter-Governmental Competition: Market Solutions to Political Problems (November 2004). CORE Discussion Paper No. 2004/87, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=746465 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.746465

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University of London - School of Economics and Finance ( email )

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