A Solution to Matching with Preferences Over Colleagues

FEEM Working Paper No. 120.05

Caltech SS Working Paper No. 1226

38 Pages Posted: 23 Jun 2005

See all articles by Federico Echenique

Federico Echenique

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

M. Bumin Yenmez

Boston College

Date Written: September 2005

Abstract

We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on preferences. Our method also finds certain partial solutions that may be useful when the core is empty.

Keywords: Matching markets, Core, Lattice, Gale-Shapley algorithm

JEL Classification: C65, C78

Suggested Citation

Echenique, Federico and Yenmez, M. Bumin, A Solution to Matching with Preferences Over Colleagues (September 2005). ; Caltech SS Working Paper No. 1226. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=746864 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.746864

Federico Echenique (Contact Author)

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

313 Baxter Hall
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States

M. Bumin Yenmez

Boston College ( email )

140 Commonwealth Ave.
Maloney Hall 327
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

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