Extraordinary Antitakeover Provisions and Insider Ownership Structure: The Case of Converting Savings and Loans

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, June 1998

Posted: 10 Apr 1998

See all articles by Glenn Boyle

Glenn Boyle

University of Canterbury - Economics and Finance; Sapere Research Group

Richard B. Carter

Iowa State University

Roger D. Stover

Iowa State University - Department of Accounting and Finance

Abstract

Insider ownership and antitakeover provisions affect a firm's vulnerability to takeover, its value, and its managers' incentives and utility. We examine the simultaneous determination of insider ownership and takeover protection using data from mutual savings and loan associations converting to stock form. At low levels of insider ownership, we find that ownership is negatively related to the number of extraordinary antitakeover provisions; at higher levels, ownership is not related to the number of antitakeover provisions. These results are consistent with insider entrenchment.

JEL Classification: G21, G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Boyle, Glenn and Carter, Richard B. and Stover, Roger D., Extraordinary Antitakeover Provisions and Insider Ownership Structure: The Case of Converting Savings and Loans. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, June 1998, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=75064

Glenn Boyle

University of Canterbury - Economics and Finance ( email )

Private Bag 4800
Christchurch
New Zealand

Sapere Research Group ( email )

Level 9, Pencarrow House
1 Willeston St
Wellington, 6140
New Zealand

Richard B. Carter

Iowa State University ( email )

Carver Hall
Ames, IA 50011-2063
United States
515-294-9438 (Phone)
515-294-3525 (Fax)

Roger D. Stover (Contact Author)

Iowa State University - Department of Accounting and Finance ( email )

College of Business
Ames, IA 50011-2063
United States
515-294-8114 (Phone)

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