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Three-Point-For-Win in Soccer: Are There Incentives for Match Fixing?

Oleksandr Shepotylo

University of Bradford; EERC

November 8, 2005

In the middle of the 1990s, the European soccer body UEFA recommended to the National Soccer Federations that they should reward three points for a win instead of two points as under the old regulations. Soon, this new system was universally adopted by all countries. The purpose of this change in the rules was to encourage a more attractive attacking style of play. While there is some evidence that this change had its intended effect, the effect has not been as dramatic as expected. The potential danger of the new rule is that it penalizes "quality" tied games and encourages teams to collude in order to maximize the expected number of points. This problem is especially relevant if teams can strategically interact during long tournaments and can lead to corruption and point trading between teams. There is also evidence that the change in rules had a heterogeneous effect across top clubs and lesser clubs. While top clubs prefer an attacking style, lesser clubs place more emphasis on defense even after this change in the rules.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: game theory, sports economics, corruption, institutional economics

JEL Classification: C52, C71, L83, P3

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Date posted: August 3, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Shepotylo, Oleksandr, Three-Point-For-Win in Soccer: Are There Incentives for Match Fixing? (November 8, 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=755264 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.755264

Contact Information

Oleksandr Shepotylo (Contact Author)
University of Bradford ( email )
Bradford, West Yorkshire BD9 4JL
United States
EERC ( email )
4016 Linnean Ave NW
Washington, DC 20008
United States
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