Political Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout Model

The American Economic Review, December 1997

Posted: 28 Apr 1998

See all articles by Ken Kollman

Ken Kollman

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Political Science

John H. Miller

Carnegie Mellon University - Department of Social and Decision Sciences

Scott E. Page

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Physics

Abstract

We construct a computational model of Tiebout competition and show that political institutions differ in their ability to sort citizens effectively. In particular, we find that certain types of institutions--those that become more "politically unstable" as citizen heterogeneity increases--perform relatively poorly given a single jurisdiction, yet these same institutions perform relatively well when there are multiple jurisdictions. We provide an explanation for this phenomenon which draws upon simulated annealing, a discrete nonlinear search algorithm.

JEL Classification: H21, H41

Suggested Citation

Kollman, Kenneth W. and Miller, John H. and Page, Scott E., Political Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout Model. The American Economic Review, December 1997. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=75548

Kenneth W. Kollman (Contact Author)

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Political Science ( email )

Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
313-936-0062 (Phone)
Not Available (Fax)

John H. Miller

Carnegie Mellon University - Department of Social and Decision Sciences ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
412-268-3229 (Phone)
412-268-6938 (Fax)

Scott E. Page

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Physics ( email )

Ann Arbor, MI
United States

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