Endogenous Timing in Duopoly: Experimental Evidence

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2005-77

14 Pages Posted: 11 Jul 2005

See all articles by Miguel Alexandre Fonseca

Miguel Alexandre Fonseca

University of London - Department of Economics

Wieland Müller

University of Vienna, Department of Economics & VCEE; Tilburg University, Department of Economics & CentER

Hans-Theo Normann

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Department of Economics; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Date Written: June 2005

Abstract

In this paper, we experimentally investigate the extended game with observable delay of Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ. Beh., 1990). Firms bindingly announce a production period (one out of two periods) and then they produce in the announced sequence. Theory predicts simultaneous production in period one but we find that a substantial proportion of subjects choose the second period.

Keywords: Commitment, endogeneous timing, experimental economics, Cournot, Stackelberg

JEL Classification: C72, C92, D43

Suggested Citation

Fonseca, Miguel Alexandre and Müller, Wieland and Normann, Hans-Theo, Endogenous Timing in Duopoly: Experimental Evidence (June 2005). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2005-77. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=756326 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.756326

Miguel Alexandre Fonseca (Contact Author)

University of London - Department of Economics ( email )

Royal Holloway College
Egham
Surrey, Surrey TW20 0EX
United Kingdom

Wieland Müller

University of Vienna, Department of Economics & VCEE ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, A-1090
Austria

HOME PAGE: http://https://homepage.univie.ac.at/wieland.mueller/

Tilburg University, Department of Economics & CentER ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/webwijs/show/w.mueller-3.htm

Hans-Theo Normann

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Department of Economics ( email )

Duesseldorf
Germany

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
41
Abstract Views
923
PlumX Metrics
!

Under construction: SSRN citations while be offline until July when we will launch a brand new and improved citations service, check here for more details.

For more information