Choice of Routes in Congested Traffic Networks: Experimental Tests of the Braess Paradox

54 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2005

See all articles by Amnon Rapoport

Amnon Rapoport

University of Arizona - Eller College of Management

Tamar Kugler

University of Arizona - Eller College of Management

Subhasish Dugar

University of Calgary

Eyran J. Gisches

University of Arizona - Eller College of Management

Date Written: July 6, 2005

Abstract

The Braess paradox (Braess, 1968) consists of showing that, in equilibrium, adding a new link that connects two routes running between a common origin and common destination may raise the travel cost for each network user. We report the results of two experiments designed to study whether the paradox is behaviorally realized in two simulated traffic networks that differ from each other in their topology. Implementing a within-subjects design, both experiments include finite populations of paid participants in a computer-controlled setup who independently and repeatedly choose travel routes in one of two types of traffic networks, one without the added links and the other with the added links, to minimize their travel costs. Our results reject the hypothesis that the paradox is of marginal value and its force, if at all evident, diminishes with experience. Rather, they strongly support the alternative hypothesis that with experience in traversing the traffic network players converge to choosing the Pareto deficient equilibrium routes despite sustaining a sharp decline in their earnings.

Keywords: Braess Paradox, congested traffic networks, choice of routes, experimental study

Suggested Citation

Rapoport, Amnon and Kugler, Tamar and Dugar, Subhasish and Gisches, Eyran J., Choice of Routes in Congested Traffic Networks: Experimental Tests of the Braess Paradox (July 6, 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=758059 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.758059

Amnon Rapoport (Contact Author)

University of Arizona - Eller College of Management ( email )

McClelland Hall
P.O. Box 210108
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States
520-621-9325 (Phone)
520-621-4171 (Fax)

Tamar Kugler

University of Arizona - Eller College of Management ( email )

McClelland Hall
P.O. Box 210108
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States

Subhasish Dugar

University of Calgary ( email )

2500 University Drive, NW
Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4
Canada

Eyran J. Gisches

University of Arizona - Eller College of Management ( email )

McClelland Hall
P.O. Box 210108
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States

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