Moral Risk and Contracts: Certain Experimental Evidence
Revista de Economia Institucional, Vol. 6, No. 10, 2004
24 Pages Posted: 28 Jul 2005
Abstract
This paper shows one type of asymmetric information problems, their theoretical implications, the design of contracts that mitigate them, as well as some experimental evidence. Furthermore, by extrapolating the results, the paper tries to illustrate certain macroeconomic implications obtained under a controlled environment.
Note: Downloadable document is in Spanish.
Keywords: Moral risk, contracts, experimental evidence, asymmetric information
JEL Classification: B41, C90, D89
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Explaining Investment Dynamics in U.S. Manufacturing: A Generalized (S,S) Approach
-
Aggregate Employment Dynamics: Building from Microeconomic Evidence
-
The Aggregate Implications of Machine Replacement: Theory and Evidence
By Russell Cooper and John Haltiwanger
-
Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity and the Persistence of Aggregate Fluctuations
-
On Estimating the Effects of Events Like the Asian Financial Crisis
By Yew-kwang Ng
-
Feedback Effects of Dynamic Hedging Strategies in the Presence of Transaction Costs