The Concept of Dominance in EC Competition Law

31 Pages Posted: 5 Aug 2005

See all articles by Damien Geradin

Damien Geradin

Geradin Partners; Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC); University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy; University College London - Faculty of Laws

Nicolas Petit

European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW)

Mike Walker

Charles River Associates, Incorporated

Paul Hofer

NERA Economic Consulting

Frédéric Louis

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP

Date Written: July 2005

Abstract

The first prong of Article 82 of the EC Treaty, which prohibits abuses of a dominant position, requires, prior to the identification of abusive behaviour, evidence that the firm under scrutiny enjoys a dominant position. Surprisingly, this issue seems to be sometimes overlooked. Enforcers, practitioners and scholars have recently paid greater attention to the concept of abuse than to the question of dominance when discussing Article 82 EC. This should not, however, be interpreted as a sign that the law of dominance is clear. Quite to the contrary, the concept of dominance raises a wide array of questions which are discussed in the sections that follow.

Keywords: abuse of dominance, antitrust, EC competition law, market definition, barriers to entry, vertical integration, network effects, essential facilities, collective dominance, buyer power, economies of scale, economies of scope

JEL Classification: K21, L12, L13, L22, L40, L50

Suggested Citation

Geradin, Damien and Petit, Nicolas and Walker, Mike and Hofer, Paul and Louis, Frédéric, The Concept of Dominance in EC Competition Law (July 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=770144 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.770144

Damien Geradin (Contact Author)

Geradin Partners ( email )

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Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC)

Tilburg, 5000 LE
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University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy ( email )

UEA
Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR47TJ
United Kingdom

University College London - Faculty of Laws ( email )

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London WC1E OEG, WC1E 6BT
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Nicolas Petit

European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW) ( email )

Via Bolognese 156 (Villa Salviati)
50-139 Firenze
ITALY

Mike Walker

Charles River Associates, Incorporated ( email )

1201 F. St. NW
Ste. 700
Washington, DC 20004
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Paul Hofer

NERA Economic Consulting ( email )

One Main Street, 5th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

Frédéric Louis

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP ( email )

60 State Street
Boston, MA 02109
United States

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