Market Integration and Strike Activity

CORE Discussion Paper No. 2005/36

25 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2005

See all articles by Ana Mauleon

Ana Mauleon

Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles; Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Date Written: May 2005

Abstract

We consider a two-country model of wage determination with private information in unionized imperfectly competitive industries. We investigate the effects of separated product markets opening up for competition as well as of further market integration on the negotiated wage and the maximum delay in reaching an agreement. From an initial situation of reciprocal intra-industry trade, an increase in product market integration will decrease the maximal delay in reaching an agreement. However, markets opening up for competition have an ambiguous effect on both the wage outcome and the maximum real delay time in reaching an agreement.

Keywords: Economic integration, product market competition, wage bargaining, strike activity

JEL Classification: C78, F15, J50, J52, L13

Suggested Citation

Mauleon Echeverria, Ana Carmen and Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., Market Integration and Strike Activity (May 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=771387 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.771387

Ana Carmen Mauleon Echeverria

Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles ( email )

Brussels, 1000
Belgium

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) ( email )

34 Voie du Roman Pays
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, b-1348
Belgium

Vincent J. Vannetelbosch (Contact Author)

Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) ( email )

34 Voie du Roman Pays
1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348
Belgium

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