Liquidity, Risk-Taking and the Lender of Last Resort

38 Pages Posted: 27 Jul 2005

See all articles by Rafael Repullo

Rafael Repullo

Centre for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: March 2005

Abstract

This paper studies the strategic interaction between a bank whose deposits are randomly withdrawn, and a lender of last resort (LLR) that bases its decision on supervisory information on the quality of the bank's assets. The bank is subject to a capital requirement and chooses the liquidity buffer that it wants to hold and the risk of its loan portfolio. The equilibrium choice of risk is shown to be decreasing in the capital requirement, and increasing in the interest rate charged by the LLR. Moreover, when the LLR does not charge penalty rates, the bank chooses the same level of risk and a smaller liquidity buffer than in the absence of a LLR. Thus, in contrast with the general view, the existence of a LLR does not increase the incentives to take risk, while penalty rates do.

Keywords: Central bank, lender of last resort, penalty rates, moral hazard, bank supervision, capital requirements, deposit insurance

JEL Classification: E58, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Repullo, Rafael, Liquidity, Risk-Taking and the Lender of Last Resort (March 2005). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4967, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=771491

Rafael Repullo (Contact Author)

Centre for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI) ( email )

Casado del Alisal 5
28014 Madrid
Spain
+34 91429 0551 (Phone)
+34 91429 1056 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cemfi.es/~repullo/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

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