Wage Bargaining and Managerial Incentives

8 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2005

See all articles by Ishita Chatterjee

Ishita Chatterjee

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR) - Economics

Bibhas Saha

University of East Anglia (UEA) - School of Economic and Social Studies

Date Written: June 1, 2005

Abstract

If managers bargain with workers over wage before choosing output in a Cournot duopoly, owners face two conflicting interests in designing managerial incentives: one for profit orientation to reduce wage, and the other for sales orientation to gain in output competition. The net effect depends on the workers' bargaining power.

Keywords: Bargaining, managerial incentives, sales orientation

JEL Classification: L12, L14, D43

Suggested Citation

Chatterjee, Ishita and Saha, Bibhas C., Wage Bargaining and Managerial Incentives (June 1, 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=771805 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.771805

Ishita Chatterjee (Contact Author)

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR) - Economics ( email )

Film City Road
Mumbai
India

Bibhas C. Saha

University of East Anglia (UEA) - School of Economic and Social Studies ( email )

Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom
+44 0 1603 593404 (Phone)
+44 0 1603 456259 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.uea.ac.uk/eco/people/saha_b.htm

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