Obstacles to Bargaining between Local Governments: The Case of West Haven and Orange, Connecticut

Urban Lawyer, Vol. 37, 2005

53 Pages Posted: 11 Aug 2005

Abstract

Limited empirical work on interlocal bargaining has uncovered relatively efficient bargaining between local governments for services like police, fire, street maintenance, and education. This paper explores the relationship between two Connecticut towns in the metropolitan New Haven area, Orange and West Haven, and suggests that bargaining between local governments can be more difficult and complicated than heretofore recognized when towns try to achieve economies of scale in the production of local public goods and to account for cost and benefit spillovers between local jurisdictions. It offers a number of legal changes that may help localities bargain more efficiently.

Keywords: Local government law, property law, contracts, industrial organization, organizational law, public finance

JEL Classification: K00, R59, L14

Suggested Citation

Myers, Minor, Obstacles to Bargaining between Local Governments: The Case of West Haven and Orange, Connecticut. Urban Lawyer, Vol. 37, Fall 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=773826

Minor Myers (Contact Author)

Brooklyn Law School ( email )

250 Joralemon Street
Brooklyn, NY 11201
United States

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