Bargaining Coalitions in the Agricultural Negotiations of the Doha Round: Similarity of Interests or Strategic Choices? An Empirical Assessment

62 Pages Posted: 8 Sep 2005

See all articles by Fabrizio de Filippis

Fabrizio de Filippis

University of Rome III - Department of Economics

Valeria Costantini

University of Rome III - Department of Economics

Riccardo Crescenzi

University of Rome III - Department of Economics

Luca Salvatici

Università Roma Tre - Dipartimento di Economia

Date Written: July 2005

Abstract

The paper aims at understanding the structural features of the bargaining coalitions in the Doha Round of the WTO. We provide an empirical assessment of the preferences of each negotiating actor looking at general economics indicators, development levels, structure of the agricultural sectors, and trade policies for agricultural products. Bargaining coalitions are analyzed by grouping countries through a cluster analysis procedure. The clusters are compared with existing coalitions, in order to assess their degree of internal homogeneity as well as their common interests. Such a comparison allows the detection of possible "defectors", i.e. countries that according to their economic conditions and policies seem to be relatively less committed to the positions of the coalition they join.

Keywords: Agricultural trade negotiations, Bargaining coalitions, WTO, Cluster analysis

JEL Classification: F13, Q17

Suggested Citation

de Filippis, Fabrizio and Costantini, Valeria and Crescenzi, Riccardo and Salvatici, Luca, Bargaining Coalitions in the Agricultural Negotiations of the Doha Round: Similarity of Interests or Strategic Choices? An Empirical Assessment (July 2005). FEEM Working Paper No. 99.2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=774084 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.774084

Fabrizio De Filippis (Contact Author)

University of Rome III - Department of Economics ( email )

via Ostiense, 139
Rome, 00154
Italy

Valeria Costantini

University of Rome III - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Silvio D'Amico, 77
00145 Rome, 00145
Italy
+39 06 5711 4723 (Phone)

Riccardo Crescenzi

University of Rome III - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Ostiense, 139
Rome, 00154
Italy

Luca Salvatici

Università Roma Tre - Dipartimento di Economia ( email )

Via Ostiense, 159
Roma, RM 00145
Italy
+390657335737 (Phone)

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