Delegation to International Courts and the Limits of Recontracting Political Power
DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, Hawkins, Darren, Daniel Neilson, Michael J. Tierney, David A. Lake, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2006
35 Pages Posted: 3 Aug 2005
This book chapter is a companion paper to the Trustee article. Where the Trustee article develops a theoretical justification for why recontracting politics will not be a central feature of state-IC relations, this chapter makes the empirical case that the tools that P-A theory expects to be a source of state influence over International Courts do not meaningfully shape IC decision-making. Locating the source of weak control tools in international politics, the paper argues that ICs are actually more institutionally independent than their domestic counterparts. The chapter explains this puzzle, and summarizes what international law scholars see as contributing to international court independence - features of the contract design which are fixed or one-shot, and thus do not give rise to recontracting politics.
Keywords: International Courts, Principal-Agent Theory, Judicial Independence
JEL Classification: K49, K34, K5
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation