Delegation to International Courts and the Limits of Recontracting Political Power

DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, Hawkins, Darren, Daniel Neilson, Michael J. Tierney, David A. Lake, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2006

Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 05-14

35 Pages Posted: 3 Aug 2005

See all articles by Karen J. Alter

Karen J. Alter

Northwestern University - Department of Political Science; University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Law - iCourts Center of Excellence

Abstract

This book chapter is a companion paper to the Trustee article. Where the Trustee article develops a theoretical justification for why recontracting politics will not be a central feature of state-IC relations, this chapter makes the empirical case that the tools that P-A theory expects to be a source of state influence over International Courts do not meaningfully shape IC decision-making. Locating the source of weak control tools in international politics, the paper argues that ICs are actually more institutionally independent than their domestic counterparts. The chapter explains this puzzle, and summarizes what international law scholars see as contributing to international court independence - features of the contract design which are fixed or one-shot, and thus do not give rise to recontracting politics.

Keywords: International Courts, Principal-Agent Theory, Judicial Independence

JEL Classification: K49, K34, K5

Suggested Citation

Alter, Karen J., Delegation to International Courts and the Limits of Recontracting Political Power. DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, Hawkins, Darren, Daniel Neilson, Michael J. Tierney, David A. Lake, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2006; Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 05-14. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=774226

Karen J. Alter (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Department of Political Science ( email )

601 University Place
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Law - iCourts Center of Excellence ( email )

Karen Blixens Plads 16
Copenhagen, DK-2300
Denmark

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