Do Social Preferences Increase Productivity? Field Experimental Evidence from Fishermen in Toyama Bay

IZA Discussion Paper No. 1697

University of Aberdeen Working Paper Series

33 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2005

See all articles by Erika Seki

Erika Seki

Osaka University - Graduate School of Economics

Jeffrey P. Carpenter

Middlebury College - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2005

Abstract

We provide a reason for the wider economics profession to take social preferences, a concern for the outcomes achieved by other reference agents, seriously. Although we show that student measures of social preference elicited in an experiment have little external validity when compared to measures obtained from a field experiment with a population of participants who face a social dilemma in their daily lives (i.e., team production), we do find strong links between the social preferences of our field participants and their productivity at work. We also find that the stock of social preferences evolves endogenously with respect to how widely team production is utilized.

Keywords: field experiment, social preference, income pooling, productivity

JEL Classification: C93, D21, D24, H41, J24, M52, M54, Z13

Suggested Citation

Seki, Erika and Carpenter, Jeffrey P., Do Social Preferences Increase Productivity? Field Experimental Evidence from Fishermen in Toyama Bay (July 2005). IZA Discussion Paper No. 1697; University of Aberdeen Working Paper Series. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=775351

Erika Seki

Osaka University - Graduate School of Economics ( email )

1-7 Machikaneyama
Toyonaka, Osaka, 560-0043
Japan

Jeffrey P. Carpenter (Contact Author)

Middlebury College - Department of Economics ( email )

Munroe Hall
Middlebury, VT 05753
United States
802-443-3241 (Phone)
802-443-2084 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://community.middlebury.edu/~jcarpent/index.ht

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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