Unfair Trade as Friendly Fire: The Australia-Usa Free Trade Agreement

16 (2) Currents: International Trade Law Journal (2007) 70-87

47 Pages Posted: 16 Aug 2005 Last revised: 2 Jul 2013

Date Written: May 1, 2005

Abstract

Trade, economists and trade theorists advise, is a mutually beneficial exercise. Among this group, a particular set of advocates, claim that "Free Trade" is in the interest of all parties. As will be demonstrated, Free Trade is not truly "free" but an exercise of foreign policy and the implementation of policies favouring wealthy corporate interest groups. Free Trade is controlled by wealthy nations who have stacked the rules in favour of themselves, and in particular their corporate interests, and against the poor producers in poor nations. This control is used contrary to fairness, economic and ecological logic. Fair trade, by way of contrast, is an effort to balance the benefits of trade between the trading partners, and ensure that a fairer distribution of the surplus value created by trade ends up in the hands of those who most need it and produced the goods. This paper looks at a trade agreement, the USA-Australia FTA which is well suited to a case study of the various aspects of trade theory, and in particular the fairness, economic and ecological aspects. It deals with the peculiar situation of Australia, a developed, ally of the USA which happens to be located in a tropical climate.

Keywords: Free Trade, Fair Trade, International Trade, Sugar, Subsidies, Trade Policy, Fairness, Oceana, Australia

JEL Classification: F1, F13, F14, F42, H23, K2, K33, N50, N57

Suggested Citation

Sheehy, Benedict, Unfair Trade as Friendly Fire: The Australia-Usa Free Trade Agreement (May 1, 2005). 16 (2) Currents: International Trade Law Journal (2007) 70-87, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=777064 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.777064

Benedict Sheehy (Contact Author)

University of Canberra ( email )

Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 2601
Australia

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