Giving in Dictator Games: Regard for Others or Regard by Others?

14 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2005

See all articles by Alexander K. Koch

Alexander K. Koch

University of Aarhus - Department of Economics and Business Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Hans-Theo Normann

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Department of Economics; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Date Written: August 2005

Abstract

Recent bargaining experiments demonstrated an impact of anonymity and incomplete information on subjects' behavior. This has rekindled the question whether "fair" behavior is inspired by regard for others or is explained by external forces. To test for the importance of external pressure we compare a standard double blind dictator game to a treatment which provides no information about the source of dictator offers, and where recipients do not even know that they participate in an experiment. We find no differences between treatments. This suggests that those dictators who give are purely internally motivated, as asserted by models of other-regarding preferences.

Keywords: dictator game, altruism, social preferences

JEL Classification: A13, C91, D64

Suggested Citation

Koch, Alexander K. and Normann, Hans-Theo, Giving in Dictator Games: Regard for Others or Regard by Others? (August 2005). IZA Discussion Paper No. 1703, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=779067 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.779067

Alexander K. Koch (Contact Author)

University of Aarhus - Department of Economics and Business Economics ( email )

Fuglesangs Allé 4
Aarhus V, 8210
Denmark

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/alexanderkkoch/Home

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Hans-Theo Normann

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Department of Economics ( email )

Duesseldorf
Germany

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

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