Social Value of Public Information: Morris and Shin (2002) is Actually Pro Transparency, Not Con

9 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 2005 Last revised: 11 Jul 2022

See all articles by Lars E. O. Svensson

Lars E. O. Svensson

Stockholm School of Economics; Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: August 2005

Abstract

The main result of Morris and Shin (2002) (restated in papers by Amato, Morris, and Shin (2002) and Amato and Shin (2003) and commented upon by Economist (2004)) has been presented and interpreted as an anti-transparency result: more public information can be bad. However, some scrutiny of the result shows that it is actually pro transparency: except in very special circumstances, more public information is good. Furthermore, for a conservative benchmark of equal precision in public and private information, social welfare is higher than in a situation without public information.

Suggested Citation

Svensson, Lars E.O., Social Value of Public Information: Morris and Shin (2002) is Actually Pro Transparency, Not Con (August 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11537, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=779947

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