The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony

25 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 2005

See all articles by Winand Emons

Winand Emons

University of Bern - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Claude Fluet

Université Laval

Date Written: July 2005


An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of them distorts the evidence less than when they testify alone. When the fixed cost of testifying is low, the arbiter hears both, for intermediate values one, and for high values no party at all. The ability to commit to an adjudication scheme makes it more likely that the arbiter requires evidence.

Keywords: Evidence production, procedure, costly state falsification, adversarial, inquisitorial

JEL Classification: D82, K41, K42

Suggested Citation

Emons, Winand and Fluet, Claude-Denys, The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony (July 2005). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5124, Available at SSRN:

Winand Emons (Contact Author)

University of Bern - Department of Economics ( email )

Schanzeneckstrasse 1
Postfach 8573
CH-3001 Bern
+41 31 631 3922 (Phone)
+41 31 631 3783 (Fax)


Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

United Kingdom

Claude-Denys Fluet

Université Laval ( email )

2214 Pavillon J-A. DeSeve
Quebec, Quebec G1K 7P4
1-418-656-2131, ext 3290 (Phone)

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