Reforms of Environmental Policies in the Presence of Cross-Border Pollution and Public-Private Clean-Up

Posted: 2 Sep 2005

See all articles by Panos Hatzipanayotou

Panos Hatzipanayotou

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Sajal Lahiri

Southern Illinois University Carbondale - Department of Economics

Michael S. Michael

University of Cyprus - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Abstract

We construct a two-country model where pollution from production is transmitted across borders. Pollution abatement is undertaken by both private producers and the public sector. We characterize Nash optimal levels of the policy instruments in the two countries: emission taxes and funds allocated for public abatement activities. We examine the implications of a number of multilateral policy reforms. One of our findings is that the magnitude of the beneficial effect of a reform depends on the scope of the reform; if it is restricted to a subset of policy instruments, then the efficacy of environmental policy reform can be greatly undermined.

Suggested Citation

Hatzipanayotou, Panos and Lahiri, Sajal and Michael, Michael S., Reforms of Environmental Policies in the Presence of Cross-Border Pollution and Public-Private Clean-Up. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, No. 2, pp. 315-333, June 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=783015

Panos Hatzipanayotou (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Sajal Lahiri

Southern Illinois University Carbondale - Department of Economics ( email )

MC 415
1000 Faner Drive
Carbondale, IL 62901
United States

Michael S. Michael

University of Cyprus - Department of Economics ( email )

75 Kallipoleos Street
P.O. Box 20537
1678 Nicosia
Cyprus
357-22892433 (Phone)
357-22892432 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.ucy.ac.cy/staff/michael.htm

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
14
Abstract Views
358
PlumX Metrics