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Allocating Bank Regulatory Powers: Lender of Last Resort, Deposit Insurance and Supervision

Posted: 26 Aug 2005  

Charles M. Kahn

University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign; Feseral Reserve Bank of Saint Louis; Bank of Canada

João A. C. Santos

Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

We examine the optimal institutional allocation of bank regulation. We find that centralizing the lending of last resort and deposit insurance functions in a regulator leads to excessive forbearance. It also leads the bank to invest suboptimaly in loans. Giving this regulator supervision improves on both problems, but it still does not lead to the efficient outcome. In the multi-regulator arrangement, we find that it is beneficial to give supervision to the deposit insurer. The choice between the unified-regulator arrangement and the multi-regulator arrangement involves a trade-off: The multi-regulator arrangement reduces the forbearance problem at high levels of liquidity shortage but may exacerbate it at low levels. These results assume the absence of information frictions. When banks are better informed than regulators, we show that regulators may have an incentive notto share private information, suggesting it is important to consider regulators' informational advantages when deciding on the allocation of regulation.

JEL Classification: G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Kahn, Charles M. and Santos, João A. C., Allocating Bank Regulatory Powers: Lender of Last Resort, Deposit Insurance and Supervision. European Economic Review, Vol. 49, No. 8, pp. 2107-2136, 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=784647 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.260589

Charles M. Kahn

University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign ( email )

Department of Finance
340 Wohlers Hall
Champaign, IL 61820
United States

HOME PAGE: http://kahnfrance.com/cmk/

Feseral Reserve Bank of Saint Louis

411 Locust St
Saint Louis, MO 63011
United States

Bank of Canada

234 Wellington Street
Ontario, Ottawa K1A 0G9
Canada

João A. C. Santos (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States
212-720-5583 (Phone)
212-720-8363 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: HTTP://WWW.NEWYORKFED.ORG/RMAGHOME/ECONOMIST/SANTOS/CONTACT.HTML

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