Market Structure in Services and Market Access in Goods

22 Pages Posted: 17 Aug 2005

See all articles by Joseph F. Francois

Joseph F. Francois

University of Bern - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies (WIIW); University of Adelaide - School of Economics

Ian Wooton

University of Strathclyde - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Date Written: July 2005

Abstract

We examine interaction between goods trade and market power in domestic trade and distribution sectors. Theory suggests a linkage between service-sector competition and goods trade, one supported by econometrics involving imports of 22 OECD countries vis-a-vis 69 exporters. This points to linkages between market access conditions for goods and the structure of the service sector. Competition in services affects the volume of goods trade. Additionally, because of interaction between tariffs and competition, the market structure of the domestic service sector becomes increasingly important as tariffs are reduced. Also, empirically service competition apparently matters most for exporters in smaller, poorer countries.

Keywords: Market access, services trade, trade liberalization, trade and competition, GATS, strategic competition policy

JEL Classification: F12, F13, F23

Suggested Citation

Francois, Joseph F and Wooton, Ian, Market Structure in Services and Market Access in Goods (July 2005). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5135. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=784687

Joseph F Francois (Contact Author)

University of Bern - Department of Economics ( email )

Schanzeneckstrasse 1
Bern, CH-3001
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies (WIIW) ( email )

Oppolzergasse 6
A-1010 Vienna
Austria

University of Adelaide - School of Economics ( email )

Adelaide SA, 5005
Australia
+61 8 8303 5540 (Phone)
+61 8 8223 1460 (Fax)

Ian Wooton

University of Strathclyde - Department of Economics ( email )

Sir William Duncan Building
130 Rottenrow
Glasgow G4 0GE
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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