Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors

20 Pages Posted: 4 Sep 2005

See all articles by Atsushi Kajii

Atsushi Kajii

Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University; Singapore Management University

Takashi Ui

Yokohama National University - Department of Economics

Abstract

We present a model of incomplete information games, where each player is endowed with a set of priors. Upon arrival of private information, it is assumed that each player "updates" his set of priors to a set of posterior beliefs, and then evaluates his actions by the most pessimistic posterior beliefs. So each player's preferences may exhibit aversion to ambiguity or uncertainty. We define a couple of equilibrium concepts, establish existence results for them, and demonstrate by examples how players' views on uncertainty about the environment affect the strategic outcomes.

Suggested Citation

Kajii, Atsushi and Ui, Takashi, Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors. Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 56, No. 3, pp. 332-351, September 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=785429

Atsushi Kajii (Contact Author)

Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University ( email )

Yoshida-Honmachi
Sakyo-ku
Kyoto 606-8501
JAPAN

HOME PAGE: http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~kajii/

Singapore Management University ( email )

School of Economics
90 Stamford Road
Singapore, 178903
Singapore

Takashi Ui

Yokohama National University - Department of Economics ( email )

79-3 Tokiwadai, Hodogaya-ku
Yokohama 240-8501
Japan

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