Long-Term and Short-Term Contract in a Mixed Market

15 Pages Posted: 7 Sep 2005

See all articles by Eduardo Roca

Eduardo Roca

Griffith University

Mark Brimble

Griffith University - School of Accounting, Banking and Finance - Nathan and Logan Campuses; Centre for Financial Independence and Education

Abstract

With a two-period mixed oligopolistic framework, this paper analyses the interaction between the length of incentive contracts and market behaviour. Assuming an environment in which firms choose either a long-term or short-term contract, we examine how contracts differ between public and private firms. The results show that the contracts would differ completely among firms; public firm prefers to make a short-term contract while private firm makes a long-term contract.

Suggested Citation

Roca, Eduardo and Brimble, Mark, Long-Term and Short-Term Contract in a Mixed Market. Australian Economic Papers, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 275-289, September 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=786089

Eduardo Roca (Contact Author)

Griffith University ( email )

170 Kessels Road, Nathan
Queensland
Brisbane, 4111
Australia
(07) 373 57583 (Phone)

Mark Brimble

Griffith University - School of Accounting, Banking and Finance - Nathan and Logan Campuses ( email )

University Drive
Logan, Queensland 4131
Australia
(07) 373 55311 (Phone)

Centre for Financial Independence and Education ( email )

Brisbane, Queensland 4111
Australia

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
19
Abstract Views
1,192
PlumX Metrics