CEO Turnover and Bondholder Wealth

36 Pages Posted: 14 Mar 2005 Last revised: 19 Jun 2012

See all articles by John C. Adams

John C. Adams

University of Texas at Arlington

Sattar Mansi

Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University

Date Written: August 20, 2008

Abstract

We examine the impact of CEO turnover announcements on bondholder wealth, stockholder wealth, and firm value. Using publicly traded data for the period from 1973 to 2000, we find that CEO turnover events while value enhancing to stockholders, are value decreasing to bondholders, and overall have an insignificant impact on firm value. The evidence is consistent with the wealth transfer hypothesis but inconsistent with the signaling explanation. Losses to bondholders are a function of turnover type (forced, outside replacement, and outside industry replacement) and riskiness of the firm¿s debt (investment vs non-investment grade debt). Further cross sectional testing, controlling for firm and security specific measures, confirm these findings. The results contribute to the understanding of the effects of corporate governance mechanisms, of which CEO turnover is an extreme form, on bondholders.

Keywords: top management turnover, corporate governance, bondholder's wealth, firm value

JEL Classification: G3, G14

Suggested Citation

Adams, John C. and Mansi, Sattar, CEO Turnover and Bondholder Wealth (August 20, 2008). Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=786687 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.786687

John C. Adams

University of Texas at Arlington ( email )

Box 19449 UTA
Arlington, TX 76019
United States
904-476-2946 (Phone)

Sattar Mansi (Contact Author)

Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University ( email )

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