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Accuracy Enhancement, Agency Costs, and Disclosure Regulation

Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007

Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2008-38

31 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2005 Last revised: 24 Jul 2010

Michael D. Guttentag

Loyola Marymount University

Abstract

This article develops a model in which firms may commit to disclose varying amounts of two types of information, accuracy information and agency information, and in which a regulator may also mandate disclosures. The resulting analysis provides a way to better understand the complex relationship between disclosure regulation and social welfare, including issues such as: how disclosure regulation can generate social welfare gains (contra Dye, 1990; Admati & Pfleiderer, 2000), why imposing disclosure requirements on only certain firms and certain information may be efficient, and why stricter mandatory disclosure requirements may be an efficient regulatory response to more robust public securities markets (contra La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, & Shleifer, 2006).

Keywords: agency costs, disclosure regulation, interfirm externalities

JEL Classification: D62, G38, K22, M40

Suggested Citation

Guttentag, Michael D., Accuracy Enhancement, Agency Costs, and Disclosure Regulation. Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007; Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2008-38. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=789767

Michael D. Guttentag (Contact Author)

Loyola Marymount University ( email )

7900 Loyola Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90045
United States

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