The Corporate Monitoring Firm

20 Pages Posted: 19 May 1997

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 1999

Abstract

Shareholders can gain effective control over their firm's management by voting to choose an outside agency to nominate director candidates. This would give the board and management a greater incentive to serve the owners' interests, resulting in higher productivity of capital, more realistic levels of executive pay, less short-termism, and a moderation of the corporate bloat that tends to necessitate drastic cuts. Such a system would further improve corporate governance in western countries, and provide a much needed "quick fix" for governance problems in Asia.

JEL Classification: G32, G24

Suggested Citation

Latham, Mark, The Corporate Monitoring Firm (January 1999). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=79 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.79

Mark Latham (Contact Author)

Votermedia.org ( email )

Vancouver, British Columbia
Canada
(604) 608-9779 (Phone)

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