Risks at Work: The Demand and Supply Sides of Government Redistribution

WZB-Markets and Political Economy Working Paper No. SP II 2005-15

65 Pages Posted: 31 Aug 2005

See all articles by Thomas R. Cusack

Thomas R. Cusack

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Torben Iversen

Harvard University

Philipp Rehm

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Political Science

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2005

Abstract

To understand how the welfare state adjusts to economic shocks it is important to explain both the genesis of popular preferences and the institutional incentives of governments to respond to these preferences. This paper attempts to do both, using a general theoretical framework and detailed data at both the individual and national levels. In a first step, we focus on how risk exposure and income are related to preferences for redistribution. To test our hypotheses, we extract detailed risk exposure measures from labor force surveys and marry them to cross-national survey data. In a second step, we turn our attention to the supply side of government redistribution. Institutions, we argue, mediate governments' reactions to redistributional demands following economic shocks. Using time-series cross-country data, we demonstrate how national training systems, electoral institutions as well as government partisanship shape government responses.

Keywords: Public Opinion, Preferences, Redistribution, Varieties of Capitalism, Partisanship, Unemployment, Occupations

JEL Classification: D31, D72, E24, H53

Suggested Citation

Cusack, Thomas R. and Iversen, Torben and Rehm, Philipp, Risks at Work: The Demand and Supply Sides of Government Redistribution (August 2005). WZB-Markets and Political Economy Working Paper No. SP II 2005-15, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=791305 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.791305

Thomas R. Cusack (Contact Author)

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) ( email )

Institution, States, and Markets Working Group
Reichpietschufer 50
D-10785 Berlin
Germany

Torben Iversen

Harvard University ( email )

Institute for Quantitative Social Science
1737 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-384-5847 (Phone)
617-496-5149 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/index.htm

Philipp Rehm

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Political Science ( email )

Columbus, OH 43210
United States

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