Perceiving Credible Commitments: How Independent Regulators Shape Elite Perceptions of Regulatory Quality

British Journal of Political Science. 39(3):517-537.

Posted: 4 Sep 2005 Last revised: 20 Jan 2015

See all articles by Anthony M. Bertelli

Anthony M. Bertelli

New York University - Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service; Bocconi University - DONDENA - Carlo F. Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics

Andrew B. Whitford

University of Georgia - Department of Public Administration and Policy

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

Numerous recent studies have addressed how the investment choices of firms depend on elite perceptions of the quality of national regulatory regimes. Likewise, other studies show that government structures can help to support credible commitments that protect market mechanisms. We provide the first analytic discussion of elite perceptions of national regulatory quality as a function of the independence of regulators in a country's political system. Our central claims are that market operations depend on perceptions of regulatory quality and that independent regulators facilitate elite perceptions of regulatory quality because they check actors in domestic political systems. Cross-national statistical evidence suggests that regulatory independence supports elite perceptions of high regulatory quality. We also provide evidence that regulatory independence is more likely where political competition shapes incentives to intervene in business markets.

Keywords: Regulatory quality, regulatory independence, political economy

JEL Classification: 057, K20, D73, D78

Suggested Citation

Bertelli, Anthony M. and Whitford, Andrew B., Perceiving Credible Commitments: How Independent Regulators Shape Elite Perceptions of Regulatory Quality (2009). British Journal of Political Science. 39(3):517-537. . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=794089 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.794089

Anthony M. Bertelli

New York University - Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service ( email )

The Puck Building
295 Lafayette Street, Second Floor
New York, NY 10012
United States

Bocconi University - DONDENA - Carlo F. Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

Andrew B. Whitford (Contact Author)

University of Georgia - Department of Public Administration and Policy ( email )

Athens, GA 30602
United States
706-542-2898 (Phone)
706-583-0610 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://andrewwhitford.com

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