A Note on Permutationally Convex Games

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2005-83

17 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2005

See all articles by Bas van Velzen

Bas van Velzen

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Herbert Hamers

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Henk Norde

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research; Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Date Written: July 2005

Abstract

In this paper we generalise marginal vectors and permutational convexity. We show that if a game is generalised permutationally convex, then the corresponding generalised marginal vector is a core element. Furthermore we refine the concept of permutational convexity and show that this refinement yields a sufficient condition for the corresponding marginal vector to be a core element. Finally, we prove that permutational convexity is equivalent to a restricted set of inequalities and that if a game is permutationally convex with respect to an order, then it is permutationally convex with respect to a related order as well.

Keywords: Cooperative game theory, marginal vectors, permutational convexity

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

Velzen, Bas van and Hamers, Herbert and Norde, Henk W., A Note on Permutationally Convex Games (July 2005). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2005-83. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=795387 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.795387

Bas van Velzen

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

Herbert Hamers (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 4666 2660 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Henk W. Norde

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 3245 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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