Stable Networks and Convex Payoffs

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2005-84

10 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2005  

Robert P. Gilles

Queen's University Management School

Sudipta Sarangi

Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University

Date Written: July 2005

Abstract

Recently a variety of link-based stability concepts have emerged in the literature on game theoretic models of social network formation. We investigate two basic formation properties that establish equivalence between some well known types of stable networks and their natural extensions. These properties can be identified as convexity conditions on the network payoff structures.

Keywords: Social networks, network formation, pairwise stability

JEL Classification: C72, C79

Suggested Citation

Gilles, Robert P. and Sarangi, Sudipta, Stable Networks and Convex Payoffs (July 2005). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2005-84. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=795388 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.795388

Robert P. Gilles

Queen's University Management School ( email )

25 University Sq
Belfast, Northern Ireland BT7 1NN
United Kingdom

Sudipta Sarangi (Contact Author)

Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University ( email )

Blacksburg, VA 24061
United States

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